I'm not sure how one can believe something without acknowledging it either, although I provided possible explanations earlier, such as advocating a weird position just for the sake of doing so, or of not understanding language, etc. To me, an angry, resentful response towards X, because X committed some act, already communicates a "should" or "ought"-rule. If such a rule is not in mind or not meant to be communicated, other emotional responses would make more sense, such as feeling angry but angry in general and not towards any agent; or feeling general sadness.
Hm... I suppose I just see it more as anger being a natural response to a perceived attack (using attack here very loosely). In theory something along the lines of: negative feelings warn us of something bad, like pain indicating damage. An example of an emotional equivalent could be anxiety in anticipation of pain itself - or less drastic things, like embarrassment. Things like anger serve as an incentive to do something about it, for example fighting back against an attacker (or with anxiety, avoiding an unpleasant situation). It really doesn't make sense to me that I would feel 'generally' angry (over an attack) by default. I may not consciously
know who or what made me angry sometimes, but I guess in a sense it could still serve that purpose because if I was really ****** off I would be more likely to attempt to repel
any perceived attack against me, physical or emotional. Which might explain the occasional anger directed toward objects, like the stone in my shoe - it can't logically be responsible for anything, but continued discomfort still triggers the 'do something about this' feeling.
Normally though, I would think being angry like that would risk being fairly counter-productive... potentially making the situation worse by causing me to overreact to small things. So I think the case of being angry
at a specific target makes more sense there, like if I poke something for a long time and it bites me. The response in that case is accurately being delivered to the cause of the creature's irritation.* Money is pretty far removed from that as it only indirectly does anything useful, but I can see why I would value it emotionally in that scenario. Stealing a thing I hardly care about would get much less reaction, if any, which is lucky since being very angry then could be more detrimental than whatever eventual anticipated effect bothers me about the loss of money.
I guess it would be possible to phrase that in terms of a rule, but I don't think that would lead me to the sort of 'moral compass' people talk about some murderers and such lacking. In the lack of this mechanism, (er... thing) it seems one would not feel at all. Although I suppose it might be that it was never correct to imply the process/thing/system was
missing to begin with, and when people say that one lacks it they just mean that it works differently in that person to what is normal.
*(On the other hand, it might be that I'm gigantic and menacing and probably better to run away from than provoke, in which case the thing in question might feel fear instead. But it probably would have done that already before poking, if it was going to.)
The word 'feeling' is, at least in moral contexts but probably in many others, a misleading term, since feelings often tend to be seen as somehow separated from e.g. beliefs and "reason" -- reason vs. emotion, logic vs. feeling. Whereas in reality, a representation of some fact or situation (a "belief") is associated with a particularly colored way of experiencing that representation (a "feeling"), and maybe with the commitment to a certain action because of this representation (an "intention"), and maybe others. All these elements form a unified whole. And a moral view/belief/value I hold is an example of such a whole. It is not just a "feeling", nor is it a factual belief, nor is it just a commitment to action. It is all those things, and probably more than the sum of those elements.
And no, I wouldn't say the strength of my emotion determines how wrong I think something is. If I'm not personally invested in a murder taking place in Germany, I might have less of an emotional response to reading about that murder, than I have when someone cuts in line when I'm buying a ticket. That in no way means I think the act of murdering someone is less wrong than the act of cutting in line: quite the opposite.
Well, I think I get the part about what it's made up
of... though, I'm not sure by what process it would actually become a moral from these things.