Sevenseas
the original disconnect
- Joined
- Jul 23, 2012
- Reaction score
- 26
Like Nog was saying, a lot depends on what you mean by "the natural world". Are natural events a part of the natural world, even though events are not necessarily (natural) objects, per se? (Or are events perhaps merely attributes to the only thing that is a part of a natural world: natural objects?) How about relations between natural objects? How about natural states-of-affairs or facts? All these entities or concepts still very much involve natural objects. And yet even with them, it is already to me an open question, whether they are "a part of the natural world" -- or, maybe to put it another way, whether something like natural relations or natural states-of-affairs exist. So I think one would first need to figure out those, before moving into something that is more abstract, more idealized -- one degree further removed from natural objects -- such as mathematical laws or principles in logic.
I would say that many mathematical laws apply or are true of natural objects (they apply to the triangles you physically create, or to sets of objects that you compare and organize in physical reality). And in that sense, they could perhaps be seen as belonging to a group of facts or states-of-affairs which also includes ordinary natural facts ("the water is frozen"). But then, we would need to first establish what I was saying above, namely whether our "world" consists of, say, only spatio-temporal objects, or whether it also involves relations and facts, etc.
To me, talking about "the natural world" suggests the connotation of a world independent from human thought and culture, and so perhaps what the expression is aiming at is "independent existence" and/or "objective reality" (maybe those two are interchangeable?). But even those concepts are pretty difficult to define. Independent of what? Not of humans: many physical (and to me, natural) objects or processes exist in human bodies, and the fact that they wouldn't exist without humans obviously doesn't make them any less part of an independently existing, objective reality. Maybe it could mean "independent of being represented" -- if something existed even when there was no representation of it (in thought, in writing, in perception, etc.), then maybe it would "exist independently", be part of an "objective reality". But what does it mean for X to exist? 'Existence' would seem to just invoke those other terms (such as independence, reality or objectivity). The question of what we mean by X existing is merely just one way, among others, of asking the same question again, of whether such things as mathematical laws are a part of nature.
Maybe the issue should be framed in terms of sentences or propositions and their truth. Mathematical principles being part of the natural world, or of objective reality, would then mean that they would be true propositions or sentences even at a point in time where there was no representation of them. But would that be enough? Maybe English grammar or spelling rules could still be said to be true, in a future universe where all sentient life was eliminated, as rules pertaining to a product of human culture created in the past. When saying "'horses runned' is not correct but 'horses ran' is", the words 'horses' and 'run' could simply refer back to a time when the English language was used. And mathematical laws without current representation of them could then likewise refer to human-cultural objects of the past. So then we would need to insist that mathematical propositions be true in a situation where they were, not just "are not represented now" but also "have never been represented" (but then by thinking about those never-represented propositions, we would be representing them).
I would say that many mathematical laws apply or are true of natural objects (they apply to the triangles you physically create, or to sets of objects that you compare and organize in physical reality). And in that sense, they could perhaps be seen as belonging to a group of facts or states-of-affairs which also includes ordinary natural facts ("the water is frozen"). But then, we would need to first establish what I was saying above, namely whether our "world" consists of, say, only spatio-temporal objects, or whether it also involves relations and facts, etc.
To me, talking about "the natural world" suggests the connotation of a world independent from human thought and culture, and so perhaps what the expression is aiming at is "independent existence" and/or "objective reality" (maybe those two are interchangeable?). But even those concepts are pretty difficult to define. Independent of what? Not of humans: many physical (and to me, natural) objects or processes exist in human bodies, and the fact that they wouldn't exist without humans obviously doesn't make them any less part of an independently existing, objective reality. Maybe it could mean "independent of being represented" -- if something existed even when there was no representation of it (in thought, in writing, in perception, etc.), then maybe it would "exist independently", be part of an "objective reality". But what does it mean for X to exist? 'Existence' would seem to just invoke those other terms (such as independence, reality or objectivity). The question of what we mean by X existing is merely just one way, among others, of asking the same question again, of whether such things as mathematical laws are a part of nature.
Maybe the issue should be framed in terms of sentences or propositions and their truth. Mathematical principles being part of the natural world, or of objective reality, would then mean that they would be true propositions or sentences even at a point in time where there was no representation of them. But would that be enough? Maybe English grammar or spelling rules could still be said to be true, in a future universe where all sentient life was eliminated, as rules pertaining to a product of human culture created in the past. When saying "'horses runned' is not correct but 'horses ran' is", the words 'horses' and 'run' could simply refer back to a time when the English language was used. And mathematical laws without current representation of them could then likewise refer to human-cultural objects of the past. So then we would need to insist that mathematical propositions be true in a situation where they were, not just "are not represented now" but also "have never been represented" (but then by thinking about those never-represented propositions, we would be representing them).
