Well, I accept it on some level, but I still wonder what the difference is between a person that really feels and one that merely thinks they feel. Perhaps are subjective experiences are a sort of delusion....a language game of sorts? In any case.....I'm alluding to issues in the Philosophy of mind. I realize what I'm saying sounds nutty to people not familiar with western philosophy.
Yes...only matter of time and, in fact, I think AI rights will likely become a bigger issue than animal rights because AI, unlike non-human animals, will be able to assert themselves.
I didn't say feeling pain but not suffering, I said having pain receptors doesn't mean an animal has the ability to suffer. An animal doesn't need to experience pain, that is suffer, to respond to negative stimuli.
"Nutty"? Nah. There's another word for it, but it's less friendly. As for western philosophy, I think you will find it is a slightly wider area than Philosophy of Mind.
I think it would benefit the discussion if you could substantiate that distinction with some real evidence, especially as it pertains to fish. If it quacks like a duck, what evidence is there to say it's not a duck?
Of course...but I think you'd have to read about it. But the fact that people behave in ways that make you believe they feel pain doesn't mean they actually feel pain.
Sure, there are other words for it, my point is that philosophic considerations typically don't go over well with people not familiar with academic philosophy. Of course western philosophy is wider than the philosophy of mind, but the issues under consideration in this thread are largely those in the philosophy of mind.
The distinction is largely a philosophic one....what would you count as evidence? And not everyone agrees with it, for example, as I alluded to in my other posts there are some that don't think "experience" exists. Though I'm not aware of anybody that has argued that pain receptors are a sufficient condition for the ability to suffer (e.g,, experience pain).
I have't ignored the question at all, instead I've ask another question, namely how do I know whether I actually feel pain or merely think I feel pain? What is the difference between a person that actually feels pain and one that merely behaves as if they do? Sticking a pin in myself doesn't address the issue. If you think it does I'd suggest perhaps you aren't appreciating the underlying philosophic issues.
In what sense does a fish's behavior indicate that it knows on some level that it prefers to live? A gene that caused fish to just jump out of water wouldn't last long in the fish genome because, obviously, such fish wouldn't pass on their genes. Evolution selects for entities, whether animals or plants, that live long enough to reproduce so the lack of suicidal behavior is just a product of natural selection and doesn't require any awareness on the entities part.
I have never used the word "illusion", that is a word you've used, what I'm asking is how do we know the difference between an entity that actually experiences pain (i.e., has an inner experience of pain) and one that merely behaves as if they feel pain? An entity that behaves as if they experience pain, but really doesn't, would avoid things that cause "pain".
